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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
SELECTION OF POLLUTION CONTROL
LEGISLATION
By DONALD N. DEWEES*
1. Introduction
During the last few years increasing concern has been expressed in the
press, on university campuses, and among the public in general, over the harm
done by pollution of all kinds. While the prophets of imminent ecological dis-
aster are almost certainly wrong, there is evidence that numerous aspects of the
environment are related to health and other problems and are deteriorating at a
slow or moderate pace.' The public concern aroused by the deterioration and
by increased awareness has led to pollution control legislation being considered
and passed by all levels of government in North America. Federal agencies have
been created with the sole responsibility of looking after environmental prob-
lems.2 There have been great increases in the level of expenditure for pollution
control in both the public and the private sector.
At this time, when the policies which will control future environmental
management are still being formulated, it is important that clear objectives be
set, and that strategies be selected which will produce significant improvements
at a reasonable cost. This article will present some of the economic issues raised
by environmental legislation, and suggest the relative merits of some alterna-
tives. It will review the reasons why, under our present economic and legal
systems, pollution problems arise naturally unless some environmental control
is exercised. It will examine two legal devices by which emissions can be regu-
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Associate Institute of Environmental Science and
Engineering, University of Toronto.
1 Science magazine recently concluded that if things were getting worse, they were
doing so slowly. "We must achieve and maintain a livable environment, but we are
not about to choke to death from pollution, and the world is not going to run out of
oxygen." P. Abelson, Changing Attitudes Toward Environmental Problems (May 7, 1971),
172 Science 517. The emission of some air and water pollutants in North America
may be rising, but a major problem, auto emissions, has just begun a downward
trend, while the most easily measured air pollutant, particulates, has been declining for
years. In the United States between 1957 and 1966, 25 cities showed a downward trend in
particulates, 33 reported no change, and 2 had increased. R. Spiritas and H. I. Levin,
Characteristics of Particulate Patterns 1957 - 1966 (Raleigh, N.C.: Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 1970) at 13. The particulate level in Toronto fell by one-third,
from 194 micrograms per cubic meter in 1962 to 138 by 1969. Controlling Air Pollution
in Metropolitan Ontario (Toronto: Department of the Environment, 1971) at 8.
2 In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency was established by the
President in 1970, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A.
4321 et. seq. Existing environmental functions were gathered together in the new agency,
and new ones created. The Canadian Department of the Environment was established by
the Department of Energy and Resources Management Amendment Act, 1971. Bill 93,
4th Session. Its powers were expanded by the Environmental Protection Act, 1971. Bill 94,
4th Session.
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lated. It will consider the economic and administrative advantages and dis-
advantages of each and apply the principles thus developed to the current
regulation of automobile emissions and a proposed alternative strategy.
2. Economic and Legal Causes of Environmental Problems
The reason why environmental problems require public action for correc-
tion can be illustrated by considering an industrial source of water pollution. In
general, firms purchase the resources needed for producing their final output.
They determine how much of each resource to purchase, after considering its
market price, so that they will minimize the cost of producing their output. If
the price of one resource rises, then the firm will try to economize on its use of
that resource, and will purchase less of it. It will waste less, use less, and substi-
tute other materials for it. If, on the other hand, the price of a resource falls,
industry can use more of it if that will improve the product or if it saves on the
use of other inputs. 3 Naturally if a resource is free, and if it contributes to the
production of output in the industry, the firm will use all it possibly can. Even
if the last amount of the resource contributes very little to the final output, at a
price of zero, that amount will still be used.
Economic theory can show that resources are used most efficiently when
their price equals their marginal social cost. 4 This result is achieved or approxi-
mated automatically by the operation of competitive markets for most goods
and resources. At the present time, however, there is no market for the right to
use the air and water to carry off wastes, although this is now recognized as a
resource limited in supply. Anybody may discharge wastes into the air or water,
without charge, subject only to limited pollution control legislation. Polluters
are not required to consider or compensate for the harm they impose upon the
community around them, and on downstream users by their pollution. Because
this resource is free, it is used more extensively than it would be if a price were
paid for its use.5
Under the law of riparian rights, one whose land adjoins a watercourse has
a right to enjoy that watercourse, either in its natural flow, or subject to the
reasonable use of upstream riparians. 6 The reasonableness of use is determined
by concepts of natural uses and traditional uses, rather than the economic
productivity of the water. The law of prior appropriation, developed in the
Western United States, assigns water rights in the order in which use is begun.7
3 See J. M. Henderson and R. E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958) at Ch. 3 (Hereinafter cited as Henderson and Quandt).
4 That is, when the buyer must pay all costs incurred by others as a result of his use
of the resource. In the absence of externalities (e.g. pollution) this is the cost of producing
the resource plus a normal profit. Henderson and Quandt, at 207.
5 See Henderson and Quandt at Ch. 7. 3. A more detailed version of this argument,
applied to the case of water pollution, is contained in A. V. Kneese and B. T. Bower,
Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (Baltimore: 'Johns Hopkins
Press, 1968) (Hereinafter cited as Kneese and Bower) at 75-84.
6 Red River Roller Mills v. Wright (1883), 30 Minn. 29, 15 N.W. 167.
7 Irwin v. Phillips (1855), 5 Cal. 40. For a discussion of the law of water rights see
C. J. Meyers and A. D. Tarlock, Water Resource Management (Mineola, N.Y.: The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1971).
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Here there is even less balancing of productivity than under the doctrine of
reasonable use. Neither of these systems encourages the application of water
to its most productive uses. Neither encourages development of a market for
the distribution of water rights (which could efficiently allocate its use) since
the rights are appurtenant to land ownership and not easily transferred sepa-
rately. And neither solves the problem that the cost of proving the amount of
actual damages suffered by a small user from a small polluter may be much
greater than the amount of the damages.
Limitations on the use of air are even less well defined, relying primarily on
the law of nuisance, where even if the amount of damage can be assessed,
causation is very difficult to prove.3 These laws for water and air use, which
developed when few economic units interacted with each other and when the
prime problem was diminution of stream flow, are no longer appropriate for
efficiently allocating air and water use among densely located users who may
consume or pollute it in many complex ways. 9 Where there are many small
users of the air and water, none has a sufficient interest in its quantity or quality
to enforce what legal rights do exist. Thus air and water use is almost entirely
outside the economic system, and in large part beyond reach of the legal
system. The resulting environmental quality quite naturally deviates from what
the public would choose, since the public will is not reflected in private environ-
mental decisions.
What is needed is a legal system which will create or substitute for market
forces in efficiently allocating the use of air and water. Individual rights in air
and water use could be more clearly defined, in the hope that affected parties
would meet in conferences or in court and allocate those rights efficiently among
themselves. If the information and administrative costs of negotiation are large
relative to the value of the rights involved, as is usually the case with more than
a few persons involved, then some other means must be found to approximate
the result of this economic ideal at a lower administrative cost, and thus to
achieve a level of environmental quality more closely conforming to public
desires.
3. Pollution Control Objectives
If society can agree upon the total amount of abatement desired for a
particular pollutant, then the least cost method of achieving that abatement is
the most efficient. This will be referred to here as abatement efficiency, and it
will be assumed that it is always desirable, if not the only goal. There is,
however, a second kind of efficiency that is important in environmental man-
agement. The second meaning was referred to in the previous section, where
8 The problems associated with proving damages are explored by J. Krier, "Environ-
mental Litigation and the Burden of Proof," in M. Baldwin and J. Page, Jr., eds., Law and
the Environment (New York: Walker & Co., 1970) at 105-22. For a more optimistic view
of the role of private litigation in reducing pollution, see 1. Esposito, Air and Water Pollu-
tion: What to do While Waiting for Washington (1970), 5 Harv. Civ. Lib.-Civ. Rights
L. Rev. 32, and Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution (1970), 70 Colum. L. Rev. 734.
9 For a summary of the problems of using the law of water rights as a means of
efficiently allocating this resource, see Kneese and Bower at 84-89. See also A State Statute
to Provide Controls for Equitable Distribution of Water (1967), 4 Harv. J. Legis. 399.
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it was suggested that without public intervention, more pollution would be
produced than was socially desirable. The degree of pollution which would
just balance marginal costs of further abatement with marginal benefits, thus
maximizing social welfare, will be referred to as social efficiency. While econ-
omics usually concerns itself with this kind of social efficiency, in many areas
of public policy choices must be made among competing objectives, of which
social efficiency is only one. Thus before examining particular control strategies,
other objectives which might be used to determine the appropriate amount of
pollution will be considered, and their implications explored.
It is sometimes said that society should try to end pollution completely,
banning all discharges. As a practical matter, this is impossible. We do not
have the technology for 100 percent removal of many pollutants from stack
gases or discharge water.10 Total abatement would terminate production of
some goods entirely, necessities as well as luxuries. Furthermore, some pollu-
tants have a lower threshold level below which they are not perceptible or not
harmful or both. One could hardly justify expenditures to further reduce pollu-
tion once it is not noticeable and not harmful. Thus complete pollution abate-
ment seems both unattainable and unnecessary.
Another frequent suggestion is that we reduce pollution as far as feasible.11
This modifies the perfect cleanliness objective, to allow for cases where that is
technologically impossible. It might mean requiring the use of processes which
are considered standard in a particular industry, and are widely available at
a reasonable price. Or it might mean use of any process which has been shown
to work, regardless of its cost. Pollution reduction or treatment, like many
engineering processes, generally displays decreasing returns to intensity. As
the effluent is reduced, the cost per unit of further reduction rises. 12 This
objective could lead to expensive solutions, for a minor increment in abatement
over some less effective but much less expensive device, since it does not
permit balancing costs and benefits. It could be justified if it were felt that a
less rigorous goal could not be enforced, or that the harm from the pollution
must outweigh any expected cost of abatement.
It is sometimes said that man should avoid causing ecological changes
from pollution. This implies that the substitution of one species of plant or
animal with another because of pollution, is a change for the worse. Such a
perpetuation of the environmental status quo for all time seems arbitrary
since the present environment is one step in a long evolution, and even varies
greatly from one place to another. Another defence of maintaining the status
quo is that the current balance of nature is precarious and that any deviation
may initiate irreversible forces which could lead to great ecological changes in
10 Kneese and Bower at 4.
11 "Government and industry must... (create) technology that will allow industry
and commerce to flourish without producing (pollution) or at least minimizing it to its
lowest common denominator," Sen. Warren G. Magnuson in Hearings on S. 3072 before
the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce and the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 91-51 at 2 (1970).
12 See, for example, the rapid rise in treatment cost as BOD removal for indsutrial
waste increases beyond 85 percent: U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Administration,
The Cost of Clean Water (Washington: Department of the Interior, 1968) at 26.
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which man's survival would be less likely or less pleasant. Thus the objective
of no ecological change from the present could be justified on the basis that
the status quo is superior to some other ecological balance which might occur,
or that it is the only stable state.
Another possible objective would be the avoidance of long-run damage
to major life systems. This differs from the previous objectives in that it does
not prohibit mere changes in the ecology generally, or in any particular species.
What it attempts to prevent is the wholesale destruction of some form of life
which is an element in the provision of food or other necessities for man. Such
an objective would limit water pollution which threatened to destroy life in
major lakes or oceans, and would account for possibilities that changes in air
pollution levels might significantly alter the climate of the planet, rendering
uninhabitable currently populated areas.1 3 The focus here, however, is not
upon the impact on a particular area or species but on the long run impact on
man's survival.
The problem is that current information is not sufficient to evaluate
such long range concerns. This is evidenced by groups of scientists arguing that
air pollution will either melt the polar ice caps flooding coastal regions, or cool
the earth so that glaciers spread down from the poles. 14 It appears that the
scientific community does not have sufficient information and theory to decide
which of these entirely opposite disasters may occur. If scientists can say with
some certainty what the impact of different rates of emission would be on
climate, living systems and man, then these impacts could be evaluated and
objectives set accordingly. In many cases, however, science cannot do that,
as there is only the vague feeling that emission of some pollutants may cause
unfortunate changes many years from now.
The fact that the impact cannot be precisely defined does not mean that
it should be ignored. If there are possibilities of large scale environmental
disasters, which would have a significant impact on man's survival, it would
seem prudent to incur reasonable costs to reduce the probability of such an
occurrence. If, for example, changes can be identified which may be harmful
if allowed to proceed far enough, then reasonable men might adopt an objective
of ensuring that the change in these conditions occurs slowly if at all, to
allow time to evaluate that change before it can go too far.
In theory, the avoidance of ecological change or long-run damage to life
systems need not be inconsistent with social efficiency. If the social costs of
such change or damage are large relative to the abatement cost needed to avoid
them, then their avoidance may approximately equate marginal social costs
and benefits. Even in such a case, however, the practical application of the
objectives would probably lead to quite different results, since long-term and
aesthetic benefits are hard to quantify, and rigorous economic analysis often
ignores that which cannot be determined precisely. The policies resulting from
these objectives might therefore be quite different.
13 A summary of the ways in which man's activities, including pollution, can change
the climate is contained in The Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality,
First Annual Report (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970) at 93-104.
14A. V. Kneese, Background for the Economic Analysis of Environmental Pollution
(March, 1971), 73 Swedish Journal of Economics 1 at 4.
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The economist's role does not include selecting the objectives for pro-
grams such as pollution control. These objectives are social goals which should
be considered by members of society and their elected representatives, a con-
sensus arrived at, and appropriate legislation passed. What an economist can
do is to indicate the consequence of various policies which might be used to
pursue particular objectives. Here it will be assumed that abatement efficiency
and social efficiency are both objectives, but that some of the others which
have been mentioned may also be relevant. As alternative policies are discussed,
it will be noted where the choice among them would be influenced by the
objective being pursued.
4. Alternative Forms of Control
The pollution control policies considered here for achieving the above
objectives can be classified as direct regulation, which usually involves a limita-
tion on quantity such as an emission standard, a price change such as a tax
or an effluent charge, or some combination of these two.15 Most governmental
direction of private economic activities consists of regulations. In pollution
control there is a history of restrictions and prohibitions which specify what
emissions are legal and what emissions are not.' 6 There is also a precedent,
however, for government determination of prices, as is almost universal in the
case of regulated industries such as public utilities and transportation com-
panies. Furthermore, there is precedent for the government imposing a price,
as is the case with import duties and excise taxes. There is even precedent for
government imposition of prices on goods which would otherwise be entirely
outside the market mechanism, such as fees paid for licenses to do business,
sewer fees paid for connection to or use of municipal sewage systems, and
tolls paid for the use of highways. In the last examples the government sets
a price which must be paid to the government, while in the earlier examples
government sets the price which one private party pays to another private party.
Actually, regulation and prohibition can be seen as a special kind of
pricing. If pollution above a certain level is prohibited, with a fine for viola-
tion, then the price of polluting is zero up to that level, and a fixed amount for
any excess. A small increase in emissions from just below to just above the
standard results in a large payment, while no other change makes any difference.
An effluent charge is a fixed price per unit of emissions, so the total payment is
proportional to the amount discharged. Any change in emissions will change
the amount paid. They differ in that violating a prohibition also places the
polluter in the position of at least a minor criminal, while liability for an
effluent charge is not a violation at all.
15 The term "effluent charge" will be used for any price imposed for discharging
wastes, when that price is in some way related to the quantity discharged. Other policies
such as subsidies, tax reductions, and government grants have been dealt with elsewhere,
and are not considered here. See Kneese and Bower at 101-104 for a criticism of subsidies,
and L. Waverman, Fiscal Instruments and Pollution. An Evaluation of Canadian Legisla-
tion (1970), 18 Canadian Tax Journal 505.
16 Such restrictions may prohibit smoke of a certain darkness, an early form of air
pollution regulation, or may specify allowable concentrations of pollutants in waste
gases or water. Any emissions greater than the standard, subject the emitter to criminal
sanctions including at least a fine, and perhaps the risk of incarceration.
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The imposition of a waste discharge fee or effluent charge would have
two effects. The first is a money transfer from the polluter to the agency which
imposes the charge. This is the "income effect." The other is to give the
polluter an incentive to reduce his waste discharge as far as economically
possible. This is the "substitution effect," which reflects the incentive caused
by any price change. The primary reason for price changes or effluent charges
discussed here as pollution control policies is their substitution effect. They
are intended not to raise money for the governmental agency, but rather to
encourage polluters to reduce their emissions.'
7
If the cost for each source of pollution to reduce its effluent by different
amounts were known, then it would be possible to predict how much abatement
would result from any specified effluent charge. With this information one
could set an effluent charge to achieve any particular level of pollution abate-
ment. In this case, the same environmental result could be achieved by use
of price changes or constraints.' 8 The two policies would differ only in the
income effect.
Any form of pollution management will constitute a change in property
rights. Use of a direct regulation limits previously held rights to discharge
unlimited quantities of waste into the air or water. Use of a price mechanism
imposes a charge for the exercise of rights which used to be granted for free.
The two major classifications differ primarily in the manner in which these
rights are allocated and transferred.
Each of these two broad classifications of policies can be subdivided
again into two parts,19 producing four distinct policies.
(a) Specify the quantity of pollution allowed to each source.
This regulation may be in terms of density or total quantity of pollution.
It is the almost universal form for pollution control in the past. It is exemplified
by the regulation: "No person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit smoke from
any fuel burning equipment, the shade or appearance of which is darker than
No. 2 of the Ringelmann Smoke Chart, to be emitted into the open air."
20
While this is a regulation of density, there are also regulations which limit the
effluent per unit of fuel burned, or some other measure of production. Here
the pollution control authority has determined the air quality to be achieved,
and how that will be achieved. That is, it has created a property right, the right
17 Effluent charges are sometimes suggested as revenue measures, to provide funds
for operation of the pollution control agency. Eg. M. Roberts, River Basin Authorities: a
National Solution to Water Pollution (1970), 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1527 at 1550. (Hereinafter
cited as Roberts). Such an arrangement, however, dilutes the authority's desire for abate-
ment, since this will reduce its revenue. It may also be tempted to set fees based not upon
efficient abatement criteria, but with a view to revenue. If receipts are mixed in the general
revenues of the authorizing level of government, and not earmarked in any way, then fees
can be set with consideration primarily of the incentive effect.
I8 Kneese and Bower at 135.
19 By looking only at regulation and pricing, we do not imply that other organizational
elements, such as regional authorities are not important. Any of these devices might require
additional public action such as construction of major water treatment plants, dams, etc.
This article is confined to examining those policies by which any public body might try
to affect wastes discharged by individual sources, independent of what other action is taken.
20 New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code, Ch. 4, Regulations §2.1 Environmental
Reporter State Air Laws 451:0561 (1971).
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to emit certain amounts of pollution, and it has allocated that right among
sources of pollution. Assuming that the penalties for violating the regulation
are substantial, there is no way for any source of emission to obtain the right
to emit more than the standard, nor is there any reward to the source which
emits less. If the impact of a particular air or water quality on the environment
is known, this is the most certain way to achieve the environmental objectives,
since total emissions are regulated directly. It can also compel use of the best
available technology, if technological capability is known.
(b) Specify the total quantity of pollution and let sources bid to use it.
Here a regulatory agency or a legislature specifies that in a given geo-
graphical region no more than a certain quantity of each pollutant may be
emitted per period. An auction would be held wherein sources of that pollutant
would bid for the right to emit desired quantities of it, with the auction con-
tinuing until the price of emission was such that the total amount which
polluters were prepared to pay for was just equal to the quantity limit estab-
lished by the agency. 21 Here the pollution control agency has determined the
air or water quality to be achieved but has permitted the market mechanism
to decide how that quality will be achieved. A property right has been created
and distributed not arbitrarily but by the market system, as are most property
rights. This policy dominates policy (a) in abatement efficiency because each
source of pollution must pay the same price per unit emitted, so that all will
tend to equalize the marginal cost of pollution abatement.22 There is, however,
an income transfer compared to solution (a) since here the polluters must not
only spend money upon pollution control, they must also pay for the right to
emit what pollution remains. This policy is as good as (a) for achieving environ-
mental objectives, since it is equally certain to achieve a desired degree of
abatement.
(c) Specify an effluent charge and let sources determine their effluent quantity.
This price change policy could be implemented by legislation or regula-
tions in the form: "A person discharging substance X into the air shall pay
an amount equal to Y dollars per ton for every ton so discharged." A form
of this effluent charge has been in operation in the Ruhr Valley of Germany
for many years, and has been introduced in a few cities in Canada and the
United States.23 This is equivalent to creating a property right in the public
21 This is essentially the solution proposed in J. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).
22 A given degree of abatement is achieved at the least cost if the marginal cost of
abatement is equal for all polluters. See text section 2, supra. In one case it was shown that
schemes which led to equal marginal abatement cost could achieve a given degree of abate-
ment up to 50 percent cheaper than schemes requiring equal abatement from all sources.
E. Johnson, A Study in the Economics of Water Quality Management (1967), 3 Water
Resources Research 291.
23 For a discussion of the Ruhr Valley Genossenschaften, see Kneese and Bower at
chapter 12. The charges used there do not reflect marginal social benefit from abatement,
but rather are intended to cover the operating costs of the pollution control authority, and
come closer to average treatment costs. The incentive effect may be similar to that of an
optimal pricing scheme, however. Winnipeg, Manitoba, charges industries for effluent
which exceeds the density of "normal" sewage and has caused reductions in BOD load
of as much as 50 percent. N. Bubbis, Industrial Waste Control in Metropolitan Winnipeg
(1963), 35 J. Water Poll. Control Federation 1413.
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regarding effluent discharge, and establishing a price for purchase of that right,
leaving the quantity to the discretion of market forces. Both the discharge by
individual sources and the total amount of discharge will depend entirely upon
polluters' responses to the particular charge. If the charge represents marginal
social damage, then this policy does well at achieving social economic efficiency.
It cannot assure a given air or water quality, however, unless the abatement
cost function is known, so it does not necessarily satisfy environmental objec-
tives. If the fee is relatively large, it can cause the use of the best available
technology.
There are actually three distinct bases for establishing an effluent charge,
which have very different theoretical foundations. What has been discussed
is an effluent charge in which the magnitude of the charge is intended to
approximate the marginal social benefit which would result from abatement,
leading to an efficient amount and distribution of abatement. It is also possible
to compute a charge which is sufficient to pay the cost of treating the effluent
at some later point.24 This would apply primarily in the case of a river where
the river itself was to be cleaned up, although it might also apply to an
industry connected to a municipal sewer system where the industry pays the
city the cost of cleaning up that industry's effluent. While this may provide
funding for waste treatment plants, it does not necessarily achieve an economi-
cally efficient degree of abatement. A third kind of charge similar to that
discussed in (d) below, is designed to provide a flexible incentive to meet
some effluent or ambient quality standard. For instance, if effluent standards
are adopted, it may be several years before industry can meet the standard
because of the time needed to construct new equipment. One way to ensure
rapid progress toward meeting the standard is to levy an effluent charge for
emissions which exceed the standard, the effluent charge being low enough
so as not to constitute an unreasonable burden but high enough to ensure
rapid progress toward compliance 25 Here the charge need have no relationship
to the social benefits accruing from the abatement.
(d) Specify quantity and charge sources for emissions beyond that quantity.
This is actually a combination of policies (a) and (c), demonstrating
that policies as seemingly different as direct regulation and price changes are
not incompatible. A property right is created in the use of air or water to carry
off effluents; some of that is distributed free for those who meet the standard,
and some is charged for and allocated by the market for those who exceed the
standard. Such a rule differs from direct regulation in that the price for exceed-
ing the standard is not prohibitively high, and is proportional to the excess,
rather than a fixed amount for any excess. This retains the incentive effects
of an effluent charge for all those who exceed the specified standard, while
reducing the income effects since the specified quantity of pollution is free.
This policy has the same efficiency and environmental characteristics as (c).
24 See Roberts at 1550, and note 23 supra. The charge could be based on average costs,
in which case the agency would be self-supporting, or marginal cost, in which case it could
incur a surplus or deficit.
25For an analysis of a proposed charge to enforce water quality standards see
0. Delogu, A State Approach to Effluent Charge (1971), 23 Maine L. Rev. 281. See, also,
W. Baumol and W. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for the Protection of the
Environment (March, 1971), 73 Swedish J. Econ. 42.
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5. Information required by various policies
Any pollution control policy will require some means of enforcement and
of determining the amount of pollution produced by each regulated source.
The cheapest and least precise means of determining effluent quantity and
quality is by process definition. Where particular processes are widely used
in an industry, it is possible to measure how much pollution results from
that process on the average for each unit of output or input.26 This procedure,
however, does not take into account variations in quality or quantity of effluent
that are caused by variation in maintenance or operating procedure. It is
therefore most appropriate for industries where the quantity and quality of
effluent are determined primarily by the process used or by the capital equip-
ment, and do not vary significantly according to maintenance or operation.
Process definition can be used as a measure of emissions for either an
effluent charge or an absolute emissions limit. For the former, if the emission
rate for a piece of equipment is known, then a periodic charge can be levied
upon the owner, proportioned to the known rate and the intensity of use (if
this varied much among owners). Alternatively if the average useful life of
the equipment is known, the effluent charge for the life could be discounted
to a present value, all of which would be levied at the time of sale. This would
give the purchaser an incentive to choose cleaner over dirtier equipment. For
the latter, one could simply prohibit the sale or use of equipment which was
not certified to meet the effluent standard.
A second method of monitoring is statistical or periodic sampling of the
quality and quantity of effluent, in which the quantity and quality of discharge
from each source is measured at random times. A statistical analysis of the
results of such testing combined with some information about the manner in
which the quantity and quality of the output vary over time can determine
what accuracy such sampling will provide at different sampling frequencies. 27
The more rapidly the effluent changes, the more frequently these measure-
ments must be made. Sampling may be used for enforcing either an effluent
standard or effluent charge.
The most precise and most expensive surveillance method is continuous
monitoring, in which every outfall or source of emission is equipped with
devices which will continuously measure both the quantity and quality of those
emissions. Included in this category would be measurement devices which
make discrete measurements but perform them sufficiently frequently that
there is little variation in emissions between measurements. This equipment is
generally quite expensive both to purchase and to operate, and there is the addi-
26 For example, the pollution control authorities in the Ruhr Valley in Germany
have established coefficients for numerous industry groups which relate their waste water
biological oxygen demand to the product output of the industry or to certain raw materials.
This system is cheap to implement because once the coefficients have been determined it
is necessary only to determine what process is being used and what quantity of output or
input that source produces or consumes in a given period of time. Since firms keep records
of output and input anyway, it is much easier to use these records than to try to monitor
the production of effluent, which is normally not measured or recorded.
27 See P. Hoel, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1962) at Ch. 6, for a discussion of the relevant statistical sampling theory.
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tional expense of gathering and processing vast quantities of data that can be
generated in this manner. Continuous monitoring would be appropriate where
few sources exist, and where variations in effluent may be so rapid that no
other means of measurement can accurately predict them.
Selection of an appropriate monitoring system will depend not only on
the costs and variations discussed above, but also on the policy which is being
enforced. If the policy is implemented by an effluent charge, then the moni-
toring need only determine the total amount of effluent discharged over the
the accounting period, be it a week, a month, or a year. Here the only statistical
requirement imposed on the monitoring would be that it produce an accurate,
long-term average measure of quantity and quality.
If the abatement policy is a prohibition against emissions which exceed
some standard, then it is necessary to determine not only the average quantity
and quality of discharge but whether a specified level has ever been exceeded,
even for a short period of time.28 In statistical terms the information necessary
to determine an average rate of emission, and the probability distribution of
those emissions, would be sufficient to give an estimate of the probability
that any particular standard had been violated. In practice, however, courts
of law would not accept probabilistic inferences that a violation must have
occurred because the average emissions are close to the absolute standard.
To prove a violation in court it would be necessary to have actually observed
a violation of the standard. Thus, an absolute standard will require a much
greater volume of data, i.e. much more frequent sampling, if statistical
sampling is used, than will enforcement of an effluent charge or regulation of
the average rate of discharge. Of course, some combination of these proce-
dures might also be used, whereby when sampling suggested a high probability
of violation, continuous monitoring would be applied.
When designing the enforcement procedure for a pollution control pro-
gram, one should know what factors have the largest impact on emissions,
whether equipment design, maintenance or operation. If the costs of measuring
to different degrees of accuracy are known, it should be possible to determine
a scheme such that the cost of additional refinement in measuring methods
no longer justifies the reduction in emissions. This would be the economically
efficient enforcement strategy.
29
A second major data problem in any pollution abatement program is the
determination of the costs and benefits from abatement. While many pollution
28 Air pollution regulations frequently specify a time limit beyond which the density
may not be exceeded. In New Jersey, for example, smoke may be no darker than No. 2
Ringelmann except that for 3 minutes out of every 15 it may be up to No. 3. New Jersey
Air Pollution Control Code Ch. 4, Regulations §2.2(a), Environmental Reporter State Air
Laws 451:0561 (1971). In some cases, the regulation may specify an emission limit over
a longer period, perhaps an hour or a day. For sulfur dioxide, New Jersey specifies a one-
hour average limit, and allows instantaneous peak emissions up to twice that average limit.
New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code Ch. 8, Regulations 52.2(b), Environmental
Reporter State Air Laws 451:0641 (1971). Statistically, the longer the measurement period,
the closer long run average emissions can be to the specified limit, without violation.
29 The cost of any abatement policy must include the cost of surveillance and enforce-
ment. The marginal benefit of abatement represents the upper limit on the amount which
can justifiably be spent on all aspects of abatement, including measurement, if social
efficiency is the objective.
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control laws and regulations do not mention them specifically, they invariably
reflect some weighing of the benefits and/or costs of the specified policy. The
agency which sets the standard usually has some idea of the cost of compliance
with that standard, and has made the judgment that this cost is justified by the
benefits to the affected area from cleaner air or water. Thus some such informa-
tion will be required by any policy.30
Unfortunately, available information about the benefits from pollution
abatement is frequently quite meagre. Even now the physical or physiological
information about the impact of the given reduction in air or water pollution
is not well developed.31 Of necessity the economic valuation of benefits is in
an even worse state, because if we do not know what the physical con-
sequences of abatement will be we cannot possibly evaluate them. 32 While
continued scientific research will no doubt improve our understanding of the
consequences of pollution and the rewards of its abatement, major break-
throughs do not appear imminent. In industries which have controlled emis-
sions for a long time, the abatement technology may be well developed and
static, with highly predictable costs. Where pollution limits have only recently
been imposed, the costs of current technology may be poorly documented
and the cost of future technology very hard to predict. Thus abatement cost
data may be quite good in some cases, and in others be no better than benefit
information.
Some differences between emissions standards and effluent charges
depend upon the degree of precision and certainty with which the costs and
benefits of abatement are known.33 Four cases can be identified:
(a) Suppose that average or total benefits and costs of abatement are both
known with certainty. Establishment of an effluent standard will cause a
known amount of total abatement and a known amount of benefit, at a known
cost. An effluent charge will also cause a predictable amount of abatement and
benefit at a predictable cost. The same total abatement may be obtained in
both cases, but the effluent charge will achieve it at the lowest abatement
30 The hearings which sometimes precede the setting of such standards usually contain
testimony as to the cost of compliance with the standard, the impact on industry and jobs,
and the expected effect on environmental quality or health or some other benefit indicator.
For a collection of such material regarding automobile pollution, see U.S. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, Control Techniques for Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen
Oxide, and Hydrocarbon Emissions from Mobile Sources (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1970).
a1 "[Als in the case of water pollution, explicit evaluation of the effects upon health
of air pollution -despite considerable imaginative research in the economics of health
- does not appear currently feasible." A. Kneese, "Air Pollution- General Background
and Some Economic Aspects" in H. Wolozin, ed., The Economics of Air Pollution (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1966) at 32. See also R. Ridker, Economic Costs of Air
Pollution (New York: Praeger, 1967).
32 One of the best economic evaluations of the health effects of air pollution is in
L. Lave and E. Seskin, Air Pollution and Human Health (August 21, 1970), 169 Science
723.
33 In all cases the policies will differ in their income consequences, since an effluent
charge involves both abatement costs and payment of charges. In addition, if firms have
different abatement costs, a uniform effluent charge will achieve a given total degree of
abatement at a lower cost than a uniform effluent standard. Finally, if firms have different
cost curves, the total cost allocation among firms will differ between the two policies.
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cost, if firms have different cost curves. 34 In this case, there is no uncertainty,
and both policies are equivalent in their data needs, differing only in their
income transfer consequences and impact on individual firms.
(b) If the benefits of various degrees of abatement are well known, but
the costs uncertain, then an emissions standard will achieve the desired level
of abatement but the costs may be higher or lower than anticipated. The out-
come of the policy is thus uncertain for the polluter, both individually and in
the aggregate. If an effluent charge is levied, then the marginal abatement
expenditure will be known, as will the maximum that might be spent, but the
degree of abatement will be uncertain. The policies differ greatly in how they
allocate the risk of uncertainty as between polluters and the public.
(c) If the costs are well known and the benefits uncertain, then an
effluent standard will achieve the specified abatement, at a known cost, but
the proper standard itself is uncertain. If an effluent charge is used, the degree
of abatement can be predicted, as can its cost, but again the value of this
abatement will be uncertain. In this case, then, the two policies are equivalent
in data needs and allocation of risk.
(d) If both costs and benefits are uncertain, then an effluent standard
will lead to a known amount of abatement at an unknown cost for an unknown
benefit. With an effluent charge, an unknown degree of abatement will be
achieved, with predictable maximum cost, but unknown benefit. Here, the
policies differ in whether the abatement cost or degree of abatement is to be
unknown, that is, in who bears the risk of uncertainty. In both, desirability
of abatement is unknown, both before and after the policy is imposed.
In the rare cases where both costs and benefits are known with certainty,
the choice between standards and prices can be made on grounds of efficiency
or income consequences, since there is no risk problem, and abatement
efficiency will favor the effluent charge. In case (b) where costs are uncertain,
an effluent charge will tend to be preferred, since this will set an upper limit
on the possible abatement cost, while there is no certain limit to the amount
which an emission standard might cost. In case (c), with benefits uncertain,
there is little choice, a priori, but society may find it easier to guess at a
desired degree of abatement than at a marginal value of abatement, favoring
emission standards. In case (d), which will be most prevalent in areas where
there has been little prior regulation of emissions, the choice will depend
upon the range of uncertainty of costs and benefits. If the maximum probable
costs would not be an unreasonable burden on the industry, standards will be
preferred, while possibly enormous costs would give reason for a charge
system. If the pollution raises possibilities of environmental disaster, standards
will be preferred, while a less serious problem would suggest an effluent charge
to keep costs in line. This reasoning would seem to explain the recent decision
to discontinue development of the United States supersonic airplane, where
the environmental harm was unknown but possibly catastrophic, while the cost
of avoiding it was unknown but limited, at a maximum, to doing without the
34Here it is assumed that both policies are uniform for all sources. If firms have
different abatement cost schedules, then to achieve the same degree of abatement from
each firm would require knowing the costs for each and setting individual effluent charge
schedules.
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plane; a cost that country has borne without complaint up to the present
time.
6. Regulation and Incentives
Whatever degree of abatement is achieved now, population growth and
increasing economic activity will require increased abatement in the future,
just to achieve the same air and water quality. In addition, improved informa-
tion about the extent and harm of some pollutants may lead to a desire for
lowering ambient levels. And in many cases where regulation is relatively
recent it is reasonable to expect that great improvements could be made in
abatement capability and cost effectiveness of devices, given proper incentives.
Therefore any pollution abatement strategy should be evaluated in part on its
ability to encourage technological progress in pollution control.
In this respect, abatement policies which are based upon descriptions
of qualified equipment, or standards for a given process, rank quite low. If a
particular piece of equipment which meets a current standard is certified as
satisfactory, there is no incentive to develop equipment which performs any
better. In a field where the technology is now static, and there is reason to
believe that under the best conditions little improvement would come in a
long period of time, this sort of regulation may be quite satisfactory.35 In areas
where the control technology is new, or there is reason to believe that it could
be rapidly improved, such regulation is undesirable. The regulatory body
would expend great effort keeping pace with current and future technological
capabilities so that it could approve equipment which approached these
changing capabilities.
Effluent standards are only moderately better than equipment standards.
If existing technology can meet the effluent standard, then there is no incentive
for research on more effective devices. This will only occur if there is a
likelihood that the standards will be reviewed and made more stringent. Such
a strategy, however, poses the very real problem that if industry makes no
obvious advances, it will be difficult for the regulatory agency to impose
standards stricter than those which can be met by existing technology.36
It seems clear that the best incentives are generated by programs which
include an effluent charge based upon actual measurement of emissions.
Under such a system, no matter what the existing technology, there is always
an incentive for the manufacturer of control devices or for the polluter to
search for some means to achieve a greater degree of abatement at a minimum
cost. When abatement can be reduced at a cost lower than the savings in
effluent charge, it will be advantageous for the polluter to install such
equipment. 37
Some pollution control equipment produces about the same pollution
per unit of output regardless of maintenance or operation, while other control
35 This may be the case for sewage treatment plants, whose technology has not
changed dramatically for 50 years.
36 For one view of the problems encountered in setting such standards for the auto-
mobile, see J. Esposito, Vanishing Air (New York: Grossman, 1970).
37 This point is developed more fully in section 8, infra.
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equipment may be very sensitive to these factors. Equipment specification or
process standards alone provide no incentive for effective maintenance and
operation. Effluent standards do provide such an incentive, up to the point
where the standard is met. The effluent charge when based on actual emissions
provides a continuous incentive at any level of pollution to maintain and
operate the equipment efficiently, and thus is particularly desirable where these
factors have a significant impact upon emissions.
7. Temporal and Spatial Variations
Any pollution control policy must deal explicitly or implicitly with
several kinds of variations over both time and space. Stream flow varies
enormously from one season to another,38 and so, to a lesser extent does air
movement and thus the ability to carry off wastes. This means that the
ambient air or water quality resulting from a constant rate of discharge will
also vary over time, changing the harm done by a given unit of pollution.
Any of the abatement policies might be specified to take account of this
kind of variation. Quantity limits or effluent charges could be specified by
month or even day, varying according to expected assimilative capacity. Equip-
ment specification or process definition is less adaptable than the other surveil-
lance techniques to seasonal variation, because it does not allow for variations
in operating procedure or maintenance. It does, however, permit reductions in
pollution by reducing the total level of activity of the plant or industry.
Urban areas generally have high average levels of pollution and suffer
more damage from any particular amount of pollution because of the con-
centration of affected population. It is generally assumed that this would require
stricter standards in heavily populated urban areas than in rural areas, since
the harm from pollution is generally thought of in terms of its impact on
health, and more people's health is affected where the population density is
high than where it is low. One result of such a program would be to encourage
highly polluting industries to move from urban areas to more rural areas,
creating a more uniform distribution of pollution across the country.
In fact, people may place a high value on the existence of some particularly
clean areas where they can escape from the dirt of the city. Furthermore,
people's tastes differ, and there may be some who value highly clean areas for
year-round living. Therefore even if the objective is the promotion of social
economic efficiency, when all preferences are counted, standards may be strict
in lightly populated areas which have particular recreational or wilderness
significance. When looking at other objectives such as avoiding changes from
present ecological conditions, the desired ambient air or water quality will vary
from one place to another depending upon the sensitivity of the local ecology
to the particular pollutants.
There are, however, great administrative advantages to policies which
provide for more uniform standards across some large geographical area. It is
easier to devise one policy and one set of rules, than to devise a number of
38 Stream flow may vary seasonally by ratios from 2 to 1 up to as much as 40 to 1.
See, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Water Quality Control and Manage-
ment (Washington D.C.: Department of the Environment, 1967) at 28.
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them each designed for a particular area. Also, a policy which provides uniform
standards throughout a country will not create industrial relocation incentives
based upon the cost of pollution abatement. Thus, there will be fewer short
run adjustments to loss of jobs or movements of employment opportunities
from a uniform policy than from one which reflects varying local conditions.
One way to compromise between desirable long run policies and the burdens
of change in the short run is to institute rules which come into effect gradually
over time, or affect only new investment rather than existing facilities.39 Any
such policy will be slower in its impact on environmental quality, but it may
incur a lower social cost in the process.
8. Policies for Automobile Pollution Control: An Example
Some of the principles of abatement policy selection discussed above are
illustrated in the following example, which compares the current North Ameri-
can regulation of automobile emission with a proposed new method of regula-
tion. In the past, regulatory bodies have tried to project the degree of abatement
which is feasible and then promulgated standards incorporating that emission
level.40 One problem in setting this standard or constraint is that abatement
costs are not known precisely. This is particularly true for automobiles because
pollution regulation is recent, and technical change has been substantial.
The cost of automobile pollution control seems to rise sharply as the
degree of abatement approaches 100 percent.41 The cost of abatement is not
well known, however, because it depends, at high levels, upon technology which
is still under development. If an emissions standard is set, a small error in esti-
mating the location of the sharply rising cost curve may cause costs much higher
or lower than were expected. This problem of uncertainty as to the location and
shape of the abatement cost curve will persist so long as abatement technology
is changing, which will cause continual problems with potential erroneous set-
tings of the abatement level. Thus, this cost curve shape, which is a perfectly
plausible and probable one, combined with uncertainty as to its precise location,
make setting of emission standards quite perilous.
Since standards must be announced a year or two before they take effect,
to give all manufacturers time to meet them, the required performance could
always lag a few years behind the best possible performance, as understood by
the regulatory agency. One way to avoid this delay is to anticipate the technical
progress which may occur and set standards which will require the incorporation
of the best technology at the effective date of the standard. But if the anticipated
39 Recently proposed regulations for the reduction of water pollution from Canadian
pulp and paper mills were described as applying automatically to new mills, but will be
applied to existing facilities only after individual negotiation. Environment Canada News
Release, November 3, 1971, Ottawa. This recognizes the difference in abatement cost
between existing and future facilities, but does not provide much incentive to attempt
abatement from existing facilities.
40 The Federal law actually specifies that the Secretary shall "giving appropriate
consideration to technical feasibility and economic cost, prescribe . . . standards . .
National Emissions Standards Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857f-l(a).
41 The cost of abatement devices is projected to rise by a factor of 10 between 1972
and 1975. The Economics of Clean Air, Report of the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, S. Doc. No. 92-6, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
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progress does not occur, some manufacturers may not be able to meet the
standard at all, or the costs of compliance may be much higher than the regula-
tory body expected. Aside from the inefficiency of imposing abatement costs
much higher than expected benefits, this raises enforcement problems. With
rigid standards and fixed penalties, a little non-compliance is no better than
gross non-compliance. 42 If the standard appears unachievable, manufacturers
may make only modest attempts to meet it; they will hardly be worse off with a
far miss than a near miss. A non-complying manufacturer may be fined $10,000
for each car or cease production.43 If only one manufacturer meets the standard,
he may be given a monopoly on auto production, which will raise serious anti-
trust problems. Both penalties seem unlikely to be imposed unless the vast
majority of makes and models meet the standard. In short, the penalties under
the present regulations are so harsh that they have little credibility.
Another problem is that some vehicle parameters such as weight, engine
size, and transmission type affect the rate of pollution emissions. By implication,
they affect the marginal cost of reaching a given emission standard, so that the
various makes and models of cars have different abatement cost curves. Thus
the present regulatory system, which imposes the same standard on all vehicles,
imposes greater marginal costs on some vehicles than others. Some models easily
meet the standard and could be made still cleaner at low cost, but are not. It is
not the least-cost system for achieving any given reduction in total emissions for
the vehicle fleet.
The range of uncertainty in abatement costs is thus quite large, if standards
are used to force technical progress. While the benefits of abatement are also
uncertain, it seems that people could state a maximum cost per car they would
willingly spend for abatement more easily than they could specify a degree of
abatement for which they would pay an uncertain, and possibly very high,
price.44 This suggests that an effluent charge might be preferable to the present
standards.
One mechanism which would tend to cause more efficient and progressive
abatement is an effluent charge which levied upon motorists the marginal social
cost which their automobile use imposed on the community around them. In its
ideal form, this charge would be proportional to mileage actually driven, it
would be proportional to the rate of emission per mile, and would be related to
the population density of the area in which the vehicle was used. Motorists pay-
ing the charge would continually search for vehicles which had lower emission
rates, other things being equal, would tend to drive less in heavily polluted areas
and would thus accrue a lesser pollution charge.
As a practical matter, such a charge does not seem feasible at this time.
Measuring emission rates anually would be quite expensive, and it is unlikely
that we could record where the mileage had been accumulated and thus what
42 Although the fine can vary up to a maximum, there is, as usual, no direction to a
court to make it proportional to the degree of violation, and thus no assurance that the
fine would be small for vehicles which barely failed to meet the standard.
43 National Emissions Standards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1857f-4.
44 For a discussion of ways to determine the public demand for, or value of, improved
environmental quality, see P. Bohm, An Approach to the Problem of Estimating the
Demand for Public Goods (1971), 73 Swedish J. Econ. 55.
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the marginal harm was. Furthermore, if the total charge was under $8 billion
per year (and this seems a generous estimate of total harm from auto pollution
alone in the United States) 45 it would be under 10 percent of average automobile
operating costs, and would thus have a small (10 percent or less) impact on
total motoring.
46
The major impact of the ideal effluent charge would be to encourage manu-
facturers to reduce the emission rates from new cars, and to encourage motorists
to buy low-pollution rather than high-pollution models. If this is the case, then a
practical effluent charge can be designed which would have the same impact as
an ideal charge and would be much easier and less expensive to administer.
For the practical solution, a charge schedule is established, based upon
estimates of the marginal benefit to be gained by a unit reduction of each pollu-
tant, averaged over the entire nation. It would be in terms of $X per gram of
carbon monoxide, $Y per gram of hydrocarbons, and so forth. When a new
make or model of car is introduced, it is tested and its lifetime pollution emission
estimated. Then a "potential pollution" charge is levied upon it, determined by
its probable lifetime emissions. 47 As production of the model continues, further
tests are made at random, and any large change in emission characteristics either
for new cars or for the same model after large mileage accumulation would be
reflected by a change in the charge rate.48 The manufacturer then has an incen-
tive not just to build clean prototypes but to impose quality control on the
production line so that the low emissions of which the design is capable will be
achieved in practice.
One example of such a charge shows that the total levy on a 1971 vehicle
would have been $274.49 This would fall as abatement technology continued to
improve. The precise impact of the proposed "potential pollution" charge would
depend on the manufacturers' response to it. Initially it would create price differ-
entials lowering the price of cleaner cars relative to dirtier cars. A manufacturer
might not like the resulting prices and change his pre-charge prices to counteract
it. If he does this the customer has no incentive to buy cleaner cars, but the
manufacturer has an incentive to promote sales of the cleaner cars, because his
profit margin on them is now relatively higher. Furthermore, if there is compe-
tition from other manufacturers, he may not be able to maintain his differential
profit levels; competition may force him to sell his clean cars at a low price or
45D. Dewees, Automobile Air Pollution: An Economic Analysis (Ph.D. Thesis,
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Sept. 1971) at Ch. 7. (Hereinafter cited
as Dewees).
46 Id., at Ch. 6.
47 See also R. d'Arge, T. Clark and 0. Bubik, Automobile Exhaust Emissions Taxes:
Methodology and Some Preliminary Tests (Project Clean Air, Research Project S-12,
University of California at Riverside, September 1970).
48 Measuring emissions by a full California Seven Mode Cycle is sufficiently expensive
that it could hardly be worthwhile to measure every car built. Instead the vehicles can be
grouped into make, model, engine and transmission types which have essentially identical
emission characteristics. It is necessary only to test a statistically significant sample of each
type to estimate the average emissions for that type. A study of the sample would show
whether its variance was sufficiently small that it was fair to levy the same tax on all
members of that type.
49 Dewees, at 337.
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lose sales to other manufacturers of clean cars. If the charge is just passed on to
the customer, as seems most likely, then customers will tend to buy cleaner cars
rather than dirty ones.
Finally, there is a continuous pressure on the manufacturer to improve his
pollution control technology in order to reduce his taxes. No matter how clean
his cars, if he can make a significant pollution reduction at a moderate cost, he
will do so when the "potential pollution" charge saving is greater than the
increase in manufacturing cost. In short, better pollution control is just like a
production cost saving in the eyes of the manufacturer. Comparing the hypo-
thetical charge with recent abatement costs shows it would be sufficient to pro-
duce the exhaust control achieved thus far and would cause installation of more
advanced devices as soon as cost or performance improved a little beyond
current projections.5 0 Because auto emissions have been regulated for less than
a decade, and the potential for technical progress is great, this incentive effect
outweighs the problem that uncertain benefits make setting such a charge risky.
It may be objected by some that we should not allow people to purchase
the right to pollute by paying a tax on a dirtier car. This is an argument not
about efficiency but about equity: an argument that there are some things the
rich should not be permitted to do with their money. To satisfy such critics while
retaining the advantages of the potential pollution scheme, a maximum emission
level could be added for which the fee would be prohibitive. Since this upper
limit would not be the force which caused technical progress, it need only be set
at some level which is known to be achievable with generally available tech-
nology. It would thus prevent the sale of cars in which pollution control had
clearly been sacrificed for some other objective such as performance.
The national potential pollution charge does not allow for regional differ-
ences in pollution levels any more than current Federal regulations do. The best
approach to this variation is probably provincial and local action addressed to
the problems of individual areas. For instance, a province with a severe pollution
problem might impose an excise tax on new cars or an annual ownership tax
which was proportional to the Federal potential pollution charge. Or a province
or local area could institute a program to reduce emissions of used cars.51
In considering the practicability of a proposed pollution control strategy
it is important to consider how it will fit in the existing regulatory framework.
Under the proposed, as under the existing, strategy, new models must be
sampled for emissions and estimates made of lifetime emission characteristics.
Under the proposed, as under the existing strategy, taxes must be levied on all
new car sales. Under the proposed strategy, much less governmental effort need
be directed to predicting what control technology will exist in the future, or
what is feasible now; those resources can be diverted to research to improve
50 Id., at 339.
51 Regular tune-up of used cars seems to be a relatively expensive way to achieve small
reductions in emissions. National Air Pollution Control Administration Control Tech-
niques for Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide, and Hydrocarbon Emissions from Mobile
Sources (Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970) at
Ch. 4.4. Installation of a kit to modify used cars seems much more effective. G. Niepoth,
G. Ransom and J. Currie, Exhaust Emission Control for Used Cars Society of Automotive
Engineers, Automotive Engineering Congress, January 1971. SAE paper No. 710069.
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that technology. Under the proposed strategy, unlike the present, there need be
no revision of standards every few years. The charge schedule, if properly set,
could remain unchanged until average ambient pollution had fallen so much
that marginal benefits of abatement were much lower than at present. Because
of the 10-year average vehicle life, and growth of the vehicle fleet, this would
be several years. Only the specific charge on each model would need to be
changed as its emission rate was lowered. In short, replacing regulations with a
price change will remove the conflict between government and industry, between
consumers and industry. It directs industry's natural cost-reducing efforts
toward pollution abatement, and directs the consumer's natural cost-reducing
shopping efforts toward the same goal.
9. Conclusion
Traditional pollution control legislation, utilizing direct regulation by
emissions standards with fines and criminal penalties for violations, may still be
preferred in cases where costs of abatement are easy to predict or limited, the
magnitude of the harm is uncertain or potentially quite large, costs are uniform
among sources, and improvements in abatement technology are either not
needed or not expected. On the other hand, when costs are uncertain, benefits
are small or limited, there is an expectation of significant technological improve-
ment or a long time will be needed to install the required control devices, then
abatement can be achieved more rapidly, more reasonably, and at lower cost by
use of an effluent charge. And in the many cases which have some features of
both categories, a combination policy utilizing a small amount of permitted
emissions, with a reasonable effluent charge proportional to any excess can
provide the best of both policies. This combination has the additional advantage
that it minimizes the economic value of the change in property rights associated
with the regulation.
The choice of enforcement mechanisms, between process definition and
effluent sampling will favor the latter when costs of effluent sampling are rela-
tively low, where the emissions from a given process are highly variable, and
when operating and maintenance procedures can have a significant impact on
emissions. Once these basic choices have been made, the policy can be designed
more specifically to ensure that abatement will be achieved at a minimum cost
and still satisfy other social objectives.
There is a real danger, under current policies, of prolonged inaction by
pollution control bodies as they try to become technical experts on sometimes
complex abatement technology before adopting emission standards. By adding
to the bag of policy tools more flexible devices like those suggested here, the
need for such expertise is drastically reduced, and the opportunities for delay
correspondingly diminished. Careful application of the pollution control prin-
ciples discussed above should permit selection of environmental management
policies which will reduce pollution problems from a matter of serious public
concern to one of no more than occasional annoyance, and do so at a reasonable
speed and cost.
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